

### §14.5: THREE-PERSON CONSTANT-SUM GAME

1.] Consider the following three-person zero-sum game:

	<u><math>R_1</math></u>		<u><math>R_2</math></u>	
	$C_1$	$C_2$	$C_1$	$C_2$
$L_1$	(1, 1, -2)	(-4, 3, 1)	(3, -2, -1)	(-6, -6, 12)
$L_2$	(2, -4, 2)	(-5, -5, 10)	(2, 2, -4)	(-2, 3, -1)

a.) Determine the Nash equilibria.


b.) Assuming coalitions are possible, determine the three “two-person” zero-sum games based on each coalition.

	$C_1R_1$	$C_2R_1$	$C_1R_2$	$C_2R_2$
$L_1$				
$L_2$				


	$L_1R_1$	$L_2R_1$	$L_1R_2$	$L_2R_2$
$C_1$				
$C_2$				

	$L_1C_1$	$L_2C_1$	$L_1C_2$	$L_2C_2$
$R_1$				
$R_2$				

c.) Find the mixed strategies and the value of the game for each player in the  $C$ - $R$  coalition game.



d.) Find the mixed strategies and the value of the game for each player in the  $L$ - $C$  coalition game.



e.) Determine the characteristic function of the game.