

§11.2: TWO-PERSON CONSTANT-SUM GAMES: MIXED STRATEGIES

1.] Two players, A and B, play the coin-tossing game. Each player, unbeknownst to the other chooses a head (H) or a tail (T). Both players would reveal their choices simultaneously. If they match (HH or TT), player A receives \$1 from B. Otherwise, A pays B. Set up the reward matrix for player A and find the value of the game by considering mixed strategies from each player.

$v = \text{value of the game}$   
 $-1 \leq v \leq 1$

	$y_1$	$y_2$	
	$B_H$	$B_T$	Row min
$x_1$	$A_H$	1	-1
$x_2$	$A_T$	-1	1

Col Max 1 1  
minimax = 1


B's Pure Strategy  
 $B_H$   
 $B_T$

A's Expected Payoff  
 $x_1(1) + (1-x_1)(-1) = 2x_1 - 1$   
 $x_1(-1) + (1-x_1)(1) = 1 - 2x_1$

$x_2 = 1 - x_1$   
 $y_2 = 1 - y_1$

A's Pure Strategy  
 $A_H$   
 $A_T$

B's Expected Payoff  
 $y_1(1) + (1-y_1)(-1) = 2y_1 - 1$   
 $y_1(-1) + (1-y_1)(1) = 1 - 2y_1$



**Red shaded area** = B's greatest losses (col max's)  
 Minimax = 0 occurs when  
 $y_1 = 0.5$  and  $y_2 = 1 - 0.5 = 0.5$

Thus, B should play  $B_H$  and  $B_T$  with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

**Blue shaded area** = A's least gains (row mins)  
 Maximin = 0 occurs when  
 $x_1 = 0.5$  and  $x_2 = 1 - 0.5 = 0.5$

Hence, A should play  $A_H$  and  $A_T$  with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ .

2.] Consider the following game where player A has two strategies and player B has four strategies. The reward matrix is in terms of payoff to player A. Determine the value of the game and the strategies employed by each player that results in the optimal saddle point solution.

		$y_1$	$y_2$	$y_3$	$y_4$
		$B_1$	$B_2$	$B_3$	$B_4$
$x_1$	$A_1$	2	2	3	-1
$(-x_1)$	$A_2$	4	3	2	6

Row Min

-1 maximum = 2  
2

$$2 \leq V \leq 3$$

Col Max 4 3 3 6  
minimax = 3

B's Pure Strategy

A's Expected Payoff

$B_1$   $2x_1 + 4(1-x_1) = -2x_1 + 4$   
 $B_2$   $2x_1 + 3(1-x_1) = -x_1 + 3$   
 $B_3$   $3x_1 + 2(1-x_1) = x_1 + 2$   
 $B_4$   $-x_1 + 6(1-x_1) = -7x_1 + 6$

A's Pure Strategy

B's Expected Payoff

$A_1$   $2y_1 + 2y_2 + 3y_3 - y_4$   
 $A_2$   $4y_1 + 3y_2 + 2y_3 + 6y_4$

\*Since each expected value is a linear function of  $x_1$ , we can graph it below.

\* we cannot graphically represent the two expected values. However, from A's graph we see that strategies  $B_3$  and  $B_4$  will yield the optimal value of the game,  $v = 2.5$ . Hence, a combination of  $y_3$  and  $y_4$  is an optimal strategy for B. Let  $y_1 = y_2 = 0$ , then  $y_4 = 1 - y_3$  and

$$3y_3 - (1 - y_3) = -4y_3 - 1$$

$$2y_3 + 6(1 - y_3) = -4y_3 + 6$$


The intersection will yield the optimal strategy:

$$4y_3 - 1 = -4y_3 + 6 \Rightarrow \boxed{y_3 = \frac{7}{8}, y_4 = \frac{1}{8}}$$

solutions involving  $B_2$  exist as well.

Maximum = 2.5 occurs when  $x_1 = 0.5$ .

Hence, A should play  $A_1$  and  $A_2$  with probabilities  $x_1 = 0.5$  and  $x_2 = 0.5$ .



/// = A's row minima

Value of the game:  $\boxed{V = 2.5}$